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 anniversary of the introduction of the Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996 in Ireland, 
this paper provides a descriptive account of the ancillary relief scheme applied in the 
jurisdiction on divorce and its critics. Part I presents a brief overview of the context in which 
divorce was introduced in Ireland – notably the pre-existing ban on divorce formerly found in 
Article 41.3.2° of the Irish Constitution –  before outlining key aspects of the resulting 1996 
legislation governing the provision of ancillary relief. Part II then describes the difficulties 
which have arisen in the application of this legislation, underlining, in particular, the 
unacceptable level of inconsistency apparent in judicial decision-making and the lack of over-
riding principles. Part III finally places the spotlight on the lack of foreseeability for couples 
seeking to reach an out-of-court settlement and highlights the need for reform.  
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In 1984, Walsh J aptly referred to the “troublesome” nature of family law in Ireland 
(foreword to Binchy, 1984, vi). In the intervening years, this area of law has grown 
increasingly complex and, arguably, ever more bothersome. One aspect of Irish family law 
which has generated particular controversy and debate over the years is that governing 
marital breakdown. Exactly 20 years ago, the Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996 was 
introduced, facilitating the termination of marriage by a decree of divorce. The introduction 
of the 1996 Act followed the passing of a 1995 referendum to amend the Irish Constitution 
and remove the pre-existing ban on divorce formerly found in Article 41.3.2°. However, the 
legacy of both the 1995 referendum and the prevailing social and political climate of the early 
to mid-1990s continues to be felt today. To increase the attractiveness of the constitutional 
amendment to the Irish electorate, the Irish legislature developed quite a conservative 
Divorce Bill which was published prior to the referendum. This restrictive approach in 
drafting had a considerable impact on various aspects of the current divorce regime now 
applied pursuant to the 1996 Act, none more so, arguably, than in relation to the provision of 
ancillary relief.  
As we mark the 20
th
 anniversary of the introduction of the 1996 Act, it is worthwhile to re-
consider the ancillary relief scheme applied on divorce and highlight the need for reform. Part 
I of this article provides a brief overview of the context in which divorce was introduced in 
Ireland and the key provisions of the resulting 1996 legislation governing the provision of 
ancillary relief. Part II then presents a descriptive account of the difficulties which have 
arisen in the application of this legislation, underlining, in particular, the unacceptable level 
of inconsistency apparent in judicial decision-making and the lack of over-riding principles. 
Part III places the spotlight on the lack of foreseeability for couples seeking to reach an out-
of-court settlement and the need for reform. It argues for the adoption of a more rule-oriented 
approach to ancillary relief provision. 
Part I: Ancillary Relief on Divorce in Ireland – Then and Now 
 Historical context 
Following the formation of the Irish Free State, a ban on divorce was introduced by the 
Second Constitution of Ireland published in 1937.
1
 Attempting to ensure the firm foundation 
of a Roman Catholic state for a predominantly Roman Catholic population, the ban 
represented a clear ideological and social divergence from the English position. In the 
absence of divorce, the options for spouses on marital breakdown were essentially restricted 
to two possibilities: entering into a separation agreement which constituted a private 
arrangement or availing of a divorce a mensa et thoro. The latter, however, was only 
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available on the grounds of adultery, cruelty or unnatural practices and did not affect a 
dissolution of the marriage or allow the parties to remarry. Spousal support represented the 
only ancillary relief open to the court.  
However, by the early 1980s, the increasing frequency of marital breakdown was proving 
ever more problematic. In 1983, the Irish Government commissioned an investigation into the 
difficulties associated with marital breakdown and a Joint Oireachtas Committee was 
assigned the task of reporting on the issue. Presenting its conclusions in April 1985, the 
Committee recommended the holding of a referendum to abolish the ban on divorce noting 
the law was “not comprehensive nor … reactive to the current changes in society and in 
personal attitudes to the family and marriage” (p.30). The resulting referendum on the 10th 
Amendment to the Constitution Bill 1986 was rejected by almost two-thirds of the 
population. 
Notwithstanding this failure, the Government did make certain progress in legislating for 
marital breakdown with the successful enactment of the Judicial Separation and Family Law 
Reform Act 1989 which marked a “watershed in Irish family law” (Shatter, 1997, p.383). In 
addition to establishing the grounds for the award of a decree of judicial separation, the 1989 
Act empowered the court for the first time to make a wide range of ancillary relief orders 
including property adjustment orders. Key provisions of the 1989 Act governing ancillary 
relief on judicial separation were subsequently repealed and replaced by Part II of the Family 
Law 1995 which continues to apply today.
2
 
However, the need for effective divorce legislation remained pressing. By the early 1990s, 
the incidence of marital breakdown and its associated complications was growing ever more 
serious. While 37,245 “separated” individuals were recorded in the 1986 census (Central 
Statistics Office, 1987), this number had swelled by almost 50% to 55,143 persons by 1991 
(Central Statistics Office, 1993). Building on the publication of the “comprehensive 
proposals” of the White Paper on Marital Breakdown in September 1992 (Ward, 1994), the 
Government held a second referendum in 1995 to consider the amendment of Article 41 of 
the Irish Constitution, providing for divorce and enumerating the basic criteria to be fulfilled 
to successfully obtain such a decree.
3
 This time the Government adopted a more focused pro-
reform campaign to ensure its success (see Gallagher, 1996, pp 92-93 who noted that unlike 
1986, all the major parties – the coalition government of Fine Gael, Labour and Democratic 
Left, as well as the main opposition party Fianna Fáil –  supported the 1995 referendum). 
The referendum passed with the support of 50.28% of the electorate – a majority of just 9,114 
votes.  The Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996 subsequently came into effect on February 27
th
, 
1997, supplementing the new constitutional provision and empowering the judiciary to order 
a decree of divorce. 
Throughout much of this period, issues relating to the provision of ancillary relief on judicial 
separation and divorce were especially contentious. In particular, the “central role” which the 
issue of property division played in the 1986 referendum was noted (Ward, 1993, pp.26-27).  
As Ward (1993) explained: 
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“The anti-divorce lobby argued that the introduction of divorce would ultimately 
threaten the integrity of the family farm as the courts would inevitably be given power 
to distribute property as they saw fit. The image of the disintegration of holdings 
which have passed intact through generations proved to be quite an emotive one” 
(pp.26-27).  
Fears were also expressed in relation to the vulnerability of financially weaker spouses, 
particularly women. Pre-referendum polls indicated that 64% of women as opposed to 46% 
of men intended to vote against divorce (Ferriter, 2008, 198). Considering the “acrimonious 
debate” preceding the 1986 referendum, Ferriter (2008) noted 
“…divorce was frequently depicted as something that would specifically damage 
women and their rights, reflected in the infamous comment of Fine Gael TD Alice 
Glenn that ‘women voting for divorce is like turkeys voting for Christmas’” (p.198; 
see also Duncan, 1988). 
Conscious of these competing concerns, the 1989 Act adopted a conservative approach to 
ancillary relief provision based on equitable redistribution, placing considerable discretion in 
the hands of the judiciary to determine the nature and extent of any provision made for a 
dependent spouse and children. The regime was subsequently replicated in the 1995 and 1996 
Acts, albeit subject to limited refinement: welfare entitlements were extended to first and 
second wives while clean break was virtually eliminated with ancillary relief provision made 
reviewable subject to limited specified conditions. 
Although it may be argued that the door was ajar on the introduction of the 1995 and 1996 
Acts to reconsider the type of ancillary relief regime which ought to apply, any change in 
legislative direction was extremely unlikely. As noted, the 1996 Act was released in a Bill 
format in advance of the referendum to show the direction the legislature intended to take if 
the referendum passed. The 1995 Act was also specifically designed to account for this 
potential eventuality.
4
 Retaining the vague, ambiguous and highly discretionary approach 
first introduced in the 1989 Act to deal with the thorny issue of ancillary relief provision 
remained politically convenient. In the absence of fixed rules, landowners, while still wary of 
the potential ‘disintegration’ of their holding, were at least somewhat appeased that their 
property would not automatically be divided with their spouse on divorce. Campaigners were 
also reassured that provision would be made for financially vulnerable spouses which would 
not be limited to equal sharing. Moreover, in light of the constitutional failure of the 
Matrimonial Home Bill 1993 – section 4 of which provided that where a spouse was the sole 
owner of the matrimonial home on the commencement date, or became a sole owner 
thereafter, the beneficial interest in the property would vest in both spouses as joint tenants – 
there was a fear that any general rule of fixed application, such as automatic equal sharing of 
family property on divorce, would be constitutionally challenged (this fear was over-stated, 
see O’Sullivan, 2016).5 Indeed, even if it was not challenged and was constitutionally secure, 
doubts could easily be raised in the minds of the electorate by opponents of the referendum. 
Any ensuing debate could pose a distraction from the substantive issue of divorce itself. 
Retaining the vague, highly discretionary, equitable redistribution regime with which people 
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had become familiar since 1989 allowed the Government to avoid such difficulties. This 
ancillary relief scheme was thus replicated in the 1995 Act and in the draft Divorce Bill. By 
the time the 1995 referendum came round, the fears in relation the economic consequences of 
divorce which had dominated in 1986 had been significantly allayed (see Fahey, 2012). As 
noted, this time the referendum passed and the Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996 was enacted. 
The ancillary relief scheme adopted on divorce pursuant to the 1996 Act continues to apply 
today. 
 Provisions on divorce 
Part III of the Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996 provides the courts with “ground breaking” 
redistributive powers on divorce (Buckley, 2007). Adopting an approach based on equitable 
redistribution, the judiciary are empowered to grant a wide range of financial and property 
orders with the objective of ensuring that “proper provision” is made for a dependent spouse 
and children. The “unique requirement” under Irish law to make “proper provision”6 is both 
legislative and constitutional in nature and is a pre-condition to the award of a decree of 
divorce. Although in the absence of a statutory definition of the term its exact scope remains 
unclear, “proper” has been held to be akin to “fit, apt or suitable” or ”correct or in conformity 
with rule”.7 
Notwithstanding that the judiciary are afforded considerable discretion in determining 
whether or not to grant ancillary relief to an applicant spouse, and what form that relief, if 
granted, may take, the legislation does enumerate certain statutory factors to be considered by 
the court.
8
 These factors include, among others, the financial and property resources of the 
spouses; the needs, obligations and responsibilities of each of the spouses; the age of the 
spouses; the duration of their marriage; the contribution the spouses have made or are likely 
in the foreseeable future to make to the welfare of the family; and the accommodation needs 
of the spouses. The legislation does not attach specific weight to any of the factors 
enumerated in the legislation but rather allows the judiciary the freedom to exercise their 
discretion in evaluating the importance or otherwise of each. It has been observed that while 
the courts are required to have regard to the factors, “it is for the trial judge to decide what 
weight, if any, is to be given to them in the individual circumstances” (Crowley, 2013, 
p.642).  Moreover, as Shatter (1997) explains:  
“…none of [the factors] stand alone nor should any one factor, of itself, determine the 
outcome of any particular application. They are all factors to be globally taken into 
account by the court as forming part of the circumstances which must be considered 
in determining the ancillary relief, if any, to order” (p.932).  
In addition, although the list of factors appears to be non-exhaustive, the court is prohibited 
from making any order unless “it would be in the interests of justice to do so”.9 Once these 
factors are considered, the court is empowered to make a comprehensive range of ancillary 
relief orders, adjusting the property or pension rights of spouses, ordering the exclusive 
occupation of the home or ordering a wide range of financial payments.
10
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Part II: Discretionary redistribution in the Irish Courts 
Despite the strengths of discretionary equitable redistribution regimes in regulating ancillary 
relief provision, specifically their flexibility to allow the court to tailor-make provision in any 
given situation, the weaknesses associated with such schemes have long been 
acknowledged.
11
 Unfortunately, the vague, highly discretionary and excessively broad 
approach currently applied in Ireland, exemplifies these shortcomings.  
 Inconsistency of outcomes  
A major problem with the current Irish regime is the lack of foreseeability inherent in it and 
the inconsistency of outcomes at a national level. As Martin (2001) noted, “Unpredictability 
is the key characteristic of the outcome of contested divorce cases” (p.6). O’ Shea (2014) 
recently reported high levels of inconsistency throughout the ancillary relief process based on 
her observation of 1,087 unique cases in the eight Irish Circuit Courts between October 2008 
and February 2012 and having analysed 40 case files. As well as observing that property 
adjustment orders were dealt with on a “case by case basis”, she noted that an “ad hoc 
process” was adopted in assessing spousal support “involving what appeared to be arbitrary 
percentage redistribution of equity” (p.261). She also found that there was “significant 
variation” in the approach of judges to the statutory and constitutional requirements on 
divorce (p.92). Similar findings were reported by Buckley (2007, who, in particular, saw 
worrying regional variations) and Coulter (2009) on the basis of their empirical research in 
the area. “Significant inconsistency” in family law decision-making at Circuit Court level 
more generally was also recently noted by the Law Society of Ireland (2014) which added 
that it was, “regrettable” that the spectrum of decisions was “so wide” (p.10). It added: “It is 
clear to practitioners that different judges approach cases in very differing ways” (p.10, for 
more practitioner feedback see Durcan, 2013; Walls, 2013). Although in the absence of more 
detailed empirical research it is not possible to conclude that the outcomes reached in 
individual cases are necessarily unfair, the potential for unfairness would appear tacit. Indeed, 
insofar as consistency is in itself “an aspect of fairness” (Miles, 2008, p.387), the fairness of 
the scheme at a national level appears dubious. 
 Contributing factors 
A number of factors have combined to give rise to this situation. First, a system based on 
discretionary justice is uncertain by nature. The central premise of such a regime is that each 
case is taken on its own merits and provision is designed to best meet the facts in question: 
regard to previous case law or a desire to ensure a level of coherency between decisions is 
less important than making the optimum provision in the case at hand. Second, 
notwithstanding that some fetters are placed on the exercise of judicial discretion in Ireland, 
the vague constitutional direction to ensure “proper provision” is essentially meaningless 
since in achieving this objective the legislature simply chose to refer the courts to un-
weighted statutory factors.
12
 As Crowley (2012) explains:  
“Judicial freedom to determine the best outcome in the circumstances dominates the 
Irish approach to asset distribution on marital breakdown. The open-ended judicial 
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powers exercisable to secure the vague goals of justice and fairness underpin a regime 
reliant upon subjective judicial adjudications, subject only to the over-riding ‘proper 
provision’ requirement and statutory guidelines to which the court need merely have 
regard” (p.395). 
Third, serious difficulties have emerged in relation to a lack of reporting which adds further 
to the unpredictability. The problems posed by the in camera rule
13
 have been somewhat 
eased by the introduction of both section 40 of the Civil Liability and Courts Act 2004 which 
permits limited access to the family courts by bona fide family law researchers and the Courts 
and Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2013 which facilitates media reporting on 
family law proceedings according to strict conditions. Yet, difficulties still remain. One major 
weakness is that few judgments are actually recorded. The vast majority of all divorces are 
decided in the Circuit Court, with a very small percentage initiated in the High Court. In 
2014, while 2,612 divorces were granted in the Circuit Court, only 26 were granted in the 
High Court (Courts Service). In general, Circuit Court judgments are not written and there is, 
with some limited exceptions, no stenographic record of what happens. This is, in turn, 
exacerbated by the fact that judgments that are reported generally deal with big money cases 
or complex issues of law in the High Court or the Supreme Court and are, therefore, of 
limited, if any, value in the majority of “typical” family law cases. Furthermore, with certain 
notable exceptions, many cases that are reported from the superior courts are not reasoned 
and make minimal reference to case law or legal principles (see Martin, 1998; O’Shea, 2014, 
p.89 noted that case law was “rarely” referred to).14   
 Emerging trends and lack of principles  
Although it is possible to make some general observations on how the courts tend to view 
applications for ancillary relief, the trends, such as they are, serve to merely highlight the 
confusion which prevails. First, it appears that although “proper provision” is a pre-condition 
to a decree of divorce, this may not equate with “property division”. In the Supreme Court 
decision of T v T, Murray J noted that property adjustment orders, which “to some extent may 
have the appearance of division of property”, are, in reality, simply ancillary to the periodic 
payments which will ordinarily represent proper provision (however, see Buckley, 2004, p.11 
who argues: ‘[T]here is no meaningful practical distinction between “provision” and 
“division”’).15  
Where it is accepted that property redistribution is appropriate, notwithstanding that equal 
division of assets is a possible outcome, no principle or policy of equality exists. As Fennelly 
J asserted in T v T, the relevant statutory language “does not erect any automatic or 
mechanical rule of equality”.16 Moreover, Denham J stressed, “[I]t is not a question of 
dividing the assets … on a percentage or equal basis.”17 Although in conducting her research, 
O’ Shea (2014) found that some judges tended to favour equal sharing where there was a long 
marriage and worked from a presumption of equality, they were in the minority (p.261, only 
three of the 13 judges observed in her study “clearly worked from the presumption”). The 
vast majority observed “did not appear to start with any presumption and approached division 
of assets on a case by case basis” (p.261; see also Coulter, 2009, p.105). 
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Moreover, it is not clear what precise assets ought to be included in any redistribution. 
Pursuant to section 20(2)(a) the court must consider all wealth both earned and received, 
coupled with all the available assets of the spouses thereby ensuring any property purchased, 
inherited or acquired through other means, prior or subsequent to the marriage, which are 
consequently vested in a spouse may be subject to a property adjustment order. Although to 
date the Irish scheme has not developed in any meaningful way towards the categorisation of 
“marital” or “non-marital” assets, how the asset was acquired may be taken into consideration 
at the discretion of the court and there are tentative signs that such classification of assets 
may be becoming more important (the law in England and Wales has developed a somewhat 




Finally, further compounding the confusion, considerable ambiguity also continues to 
surround the importance of key principles such as need, compensation or sharing in Irish 
ancillary relief provision. Where the resources of a couple are limited, it does appear that 
need remains the over-riding consideration with the courts looking to the future rather than 
dwelling on the past. Drawing on her empirical research conducted in the Irish Circuit Courts 
from 2007 to 2009, Coulter (2009) noted:  
“Overall, what emerges … is that judges are guided by an essentially pragmatic 
consideration of how the parties to a marriage can proceed in the aftermath of a 
marriage breakdown. Rulings are forward looking, and the history of the marriage is 
mainly of relevance in assisting the judge to make proper provision for the parties and 
dependent members of the family into the future” (p.106; see also Buckley, 2002, 
p.61). 
Consequently, it has been observed that the Irish approach to ancillary relief “appears much 
more strictly needs-based” than the other equitable redistribution schemes (Scherpe, 2012, 
p.465).
19
 At the other end of the spectrum, however, notwithstanding as the Supreme Court 
noted in G v G that “the requirement is to make proper provision … it is not a requirement for 
the redistribution of wealth”,20 where assets exceed liabilities, it now appears that provision is 
not limited to meeting needs. This was acknowledged in the Supreme Court in T v T
21
 and 
reiterated in GB v AB.
22
 In the latter case, the court instead referred to the “overall yardstick 
of parity”.23 
One way in which greater consistency could be facilitated – and much of the confusion above 
offset – would be through the judicial development of a more principled approach to ancillary 
relief provision as has arisen to some extent in England and Wales.
24
 According to Martin 
(1998):  
“[I]t is highly desirable, particularly in a common law system like ours, to codify and 
reduce judge-made family law decisions to a tolerable and flexible legal method that 
adheres to the rule of law maxim. Regrettably we cannot codify that which does not 
exist” (the only principle that can really be said to exist is the “no clean break” 
principle, see Martin, 2002). 
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Notwithstanding the passage of almost 20 years since this indictment was made, it remains 
true today. Two opposing arguments may be advanced which seek to explain the lack of 
judicially developed principles in Irish practice. On one hand, it is arguable that the judiciary 
do not feel they have a mandate to develop general principles (see Parkinson, 2005). After all, 
it has been observed:  
“The Irish process is very much temperate in its influence and essentially confirms the 
power, if not duty, of the court to decide each case with primary and almost absolute 
reference to the individual circumstances of each case before the court” (Crowley, 
2013, p.641, emphasis added).  
On the other hand, however, it is possible such a development has been shunned by the 
judiciary as potentially introducing an unwanted fetter on the discretion of the court. The 
importance of retaining broad discretion in granting ancillary relief has been reiterated a 
number of times in the Irish courts.  As O’ Higgins J remarked, “The widely different 
circumstances from one case to another … make it desirable that there be considerable 
discretion vested in the court of trial”.25 Whatever the reason, the failure of the judiciary to 
develop a principled approach to guide the exercise of judicial discretion has exacerbated the 
weaknesses already inherent in the legislative scheme. 
Part III: Private Bargaining and Legislated Litigation 
The ambiguity of the legislative scheme and the inconsistency of judicial decision-making 
have resulted in a serious lack of predictability in the current system. In particular, there now 
exists a “very high degree of uncertainty” for couples trying to reach an out-of court 
settlement on marital breakdown (Shannon, 2008). At a practical level, this presents a serious 
problem. In light mainly of the exceptionally high costs associated with represented litigation, 
few – perhaps as little as 10% – of all marital breakdown disputes are fully contested (see 
Court Services, 2007). Moreover, consensual orders are strongly encouraged by the judiciary 
with a “huge premium in family law cases where parties resolve matters between themselves” 
(Court Services, 2009; O’Shea, 2014, p.258 also reported that six out of 13 judges she 
observed “strongly encouraged settlement discussions”).26  
However, notwithstanding the prevalence of private bargaining in Ireland and the judicial 
encouragement for out-of-court settlements, the ancillary relief regime applied pursuant to the 
Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996 is clearly premised on adversarial values. The Irish regime 
envisions judicial intervention in every case to determine all ancillary relief disputes with 
little guidance, either legislative or judicial, afforded to parties to enable them to resolve such 
issues themselves. Out of court settlements are further impeded pursuant to the Irish regime 
in light of the lack of recognition afforded to pre-nuptial agreements in the jurisdiction (see 
Report of the Study Group on Pre-Nuptial Agreements, 2007). At almost every turn in the 
ancillary relief process, party autonomy is restricted while the importance of judicial 
discretion and oversight is reinforced (albeit that judicial oversight, where merited, such as in 
protecting financially weaker spouses from improvident settlements, is not always present, 
see Buckley, 2007; Coulter,2009; for more on party autonomy in Irish family law, see Report 
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of the Study Group on Pre-Nuptial Agreements, 2007; see also Crowley, 2004). 
Unfortunately, this model has aptly been described elsewhere as one of “legislated litigation” 
(this term was used to describe British Columbia’s family justice system, albeit that the 
Family Relations Act 1996 which formerly regulated property division in the province 
retained significantly less discretion than that currently applied in Ireland, see British 
Columbia Justice Review Task Force, 2005, p.12). In such an environment, innovations such 
as mediation and collaborative law, despite being “worthy and welcome”, remain “add-ons to 
what is still, essentially, an adversarial format” (British Columbia Justice Review Task Force, 
2005, p.13). 
Conscious of the move towards private bargaining on marital breakdown across the common 
law world, various jurisdictions are now actively seeking to reform their ancillary relief laws 
to reflect this new dynamic, providing a clearer “shadow of the law” in which couples can 
bargain. Considering its own equitable redistribution scheme, the Law Commission for 
England and Wales (2014) recently noted: 
“The current statutory framework for financial orders assumes that a bespoke package 
will be devised by a judge for each couple; but in an environment where legal advice 
is not easy to access, and the court system cannot provide tailor-made justice for all. 
New approaches are required to enable and empower people to devise fair solutions 
for themselves or to use other methods of dispute resolution” (at para.1.05; see also, 
Family Justice Review Panel, 2011, p.178). 
Similarly, in British Columbia, Canada, the Justice Review Task Force recommended in its 
2005 report, A New Justice System for Families and Children, “that the law more overtly 
support co-operative rather than adversarial approaches [to family dispute resolution] and that 
it more closely reflect the reality that the vast majority of family disputes settle short of trial” 
(p.81). Sweeping reform of the property division scheme applied in the province – reducing 
the role of judicial discretion and further clarifying the precise pool of assets subject to 
division – was introduced in the resulting Family Law Act 2011.  
The Irish legislature too needs to react, in particular, to better facilitate the vast majority of 
divorcing spouses who seek to reach an out-of-court settlement. It is widely considered we 
need to move away from the current vague, court-centred, equitable redistribution model, 
instead adopting a more predictable, perhaps more formulaic, approach to ancillary relief 
provision (see O’Sullivan, 2016; Crowley, 2012; de Londras, 2011, p.242; Buckley, 2002; for 
earlier proposals advocating for the adoption of a community of property approach to family 
property, see O’ Connor, 1988; Report of the Commission on the Status of Women, 1972, 
p.175). 
Notwithstanding, as Dewar (1997) explained, that “[d]iscretion and rules are sometimes 
portrayed as opposites locked into some zero sum relationship”, it is now increasingly clear 
that ostensibly rule-oriented approaches may still retain important residual discretion. As 
Crowley (2012) observes, a number of “tools” such as principles, policies and presumptions 
may be adopted which “place parameters on the nature and scope of the adjudication process” 
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and which, in turn, should “greatly assist any inter-partes negotiations” (p.400). Such reform 
would appear particularly apt for Ireland in better facilitating the attainment of “proper 
provision” in the vast majority of cases. As this author has argued elsewhere, reform based on 
the adoption of a rule-oriented approach to ancillary relief provision incorporating a 
presumption of equal sharing over certain categories of family assets – while simultaneously 
retaining residual judicial discretion exercisable in only tightly circumscribed circumstances 
– has much to recommend it (O’ Sullivan, 2016).27 Moreover, notwithstanding, as the 
Supreme Court recently observed, that “[a]ll elements of potential provision are, to a greater 
or lesser extent, interconnected”,28 the adoption of a more “pillared approach” to ancillary 
relief provision would also appear highly attractive in overcoming the weaknesses of the 
current regime (see Scherpe, 2012, pp.443-518; Scherpe & Miles, 2014, pp.138-152). 
Although at present, the 1996 Act does not differentiate between the division of property, 
spousal support or other financial remedies on divorce, with all remedies combining to 
produce a “package solution” (Scherpe, 2012, p.476), it is submitted such elements of 
provision ought to be viewed as distinct (O’ Sullivan, 2016). The introduction of such 
“pillars”, a new concept in Irish ancillary relief, would radically reduce the vagueness of the 
overall regime, promote greater certainty and ensure much greater transparency in ancillary 
relief provision.  
Conclusion 
Irish family law is now viewed as “one of the most rapidly developing in Europe” (Scherpe, 
2012, p.6). However, it is equally true that much of the current divorce law applied in the 
jurisdiction is explained by its “social, historical and constitutional background” (Scherpe, 
2012, p.464).  Nowhere is this more evident than in the adoption of the highly discretionary 
ancillary relief regime applied pursuant to the Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996. As Parkinson 
(2005) noted, “[t]he conferral of a broad discretion on judges … [is] a convenient way of 
shifting responsibility for hard policy choices by delegating that responsibility to the courts” 
(p.166)
.
 In an Irish context, choosing to pass the controversial issue of ancillary relief 
provision (in particular, family property division) onto the judiciary was a particularly 
convenient method of dealing with the economic consequences of divorce in the mid-1990s 
without drawing the ire of an electorate who were none-too-keen on facilitating the 
introduction of divorce legislation in the first place.  
Twenty years later, however, the practical weaknesses of the scheme are proving increasingly 
evident. The ambiguity, inconsistency and lack of foreseeability inherent in the current 
scheme appear to weigh particularly heavily on the very many spouses seeking to reach an 
out-of court settlement. Justices Clarke and MacMenamin delivering a joint judgment in the 
recent Supreme Court decision of MD v ND observed: “The consequences of marital 
breakdown can be difficult enough for parties without complex, protracted and consequently 
expensive litigation.”29 Yet litigation – likely in many cases to be complex, protracted and 
expensive – is precisely what the Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996 legislates for in relation to 
ancillary relief provision.  
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Although it is accepted that “‘best practice’ in respect of regulatory approach is difficult to 
identify definitively” (Crowley, 2012, p.401), the need to develop a more structured approach 
to Irish ancillary relief provision is becoming ever more obvious. As Cooke (2007) explains, 
albeit in relation to England and Wales,  
“[I]t is particularly important that the principles of ancillary relief be clear enough to 
be operated without recourse to litigation. In particular, the answer to a given problem 
should not depend upon the perceptions of an individual judge, but should rest on 
factors which individuals can work out for themselves, or with help from mediators 
and lawyers” (p.98). 
On this, the 20
th
 anniversary of introduction of the Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996, the time 
must surely have come to engage in a long overdue review and reform the law governing 
ancillary relief provision on divorce in Ireland. Let us hope the opportunity will now finally 
be grasped. 
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1
 Such a ban did not form part of the First Constitution of the Irish Free State in 1922. 
2
 Judicial separation does not terminate a marriage or legally dissolve it, merely recognising the right of the 
parties to live apart. As it is available one year after separation, spouses often obtain a judicial separation and 
associated ancillary relief before later seeking a decree of divorce. Although it is not within the scope of this 
article to consider in detail the ancillary relief regime applied on judicial separation, specifically, many of the 
difficulties with the regime applied on divorce discussed below also arise on judicial separation in light of the 
almost identical regime applied under the 1995 Act.  
3
 These conditions include a) that at the date of the institution of the proceedings, the spouses have lived apart 
from one another for a period of, or periods amounting to, at least four years during the five years; b) that 
there is no reasonable prospect of a reconciliation; and c) that proper provision exists or will be made for the 
spouses, any children of either or both of them and any other person prescribed by law. 
4
 Given the shorter separation period required for an order of judicial separation, it was always likely spouses 
would first have recourse to the 1995 Act for ancillary relief provision even if the Divorce referendum passed. 
Therefore, the ancillary relief provisions of the 1995 Act were also specifically drawn up to reflect the approach 
which it was proposed would be taken if divorce was introduced. 
5
 See Re Article 26 of the Constitution & in the matter of the Matrimonial Home Bill, 1993 [1994] 1 ILRM 241. 
The retrospective effect of the provision and its infringement on the constitutionally protected authority of the 
family were the main factors in the finding of unconstitutionality.  
6
 MD v ND [2011] IESC 18 at [21]. 
7
 WA v MA [2005] 1 IR 1, [2005] 1 ILRM 517. Hardiman J however noted it is “in fact a word of peculiar 
difficulty”.  
8
 See section 20(2). In addition, section 20(4) of the 1996 Act enumerates seven factors to be considered by 
the court when deciding whether to make any ancillary orders in favour of dependent members of the family 
other than the spouse.  
9
 Section  20(5) of the 1996 Act. In EH v AH [2014] IEHC 688 at [43] White J explained: “The Court has to 
consider the overriding principle of fairness and proportionality in making proper provision and in dealing with 
the fair allocation of the assets of the parties.” 
10
 See sections 12-19 of the 1996 Act. Preliminary orders such as barring orders are also available section 11 of 
the 1996 Act. 
11
 See for example Dewar, “Reducing Discretion in Family Law” (1997) 11 AJFL 309.  
12
 A hierarchy of factors does not form part of Irish law, see T v T [2002] IESC 68, [2003] 1 ILRM 321. 
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13
 The in camera rule, which ensures cases are heard in private, was first introduced for family law cases by the 
Judicial Separation and Family Law Reform Act 1989 to protect the privacy of the families involved.  
14
 Moreover, even High Court judgments may not fully elaborate on the relevance of the factors. The 
desirability of the court approaching the exercise of its discretion with specific reference to the statutory 
factors was recently reiterated in the Supreme Court in MD v ND [2015] IESC 16 at [4.14] per Clarke and 
MacMenamin JJ (joint judgment).  
15
 [2002] IESC 68, [2003] 1 ILRM 321 at [149]. Similarly, see MP v AP [2005] IEHC 326. 
16
 [2002] IESC 68, [2003] 1 ILRM 321. 
17
 [2002] IESC 68, [2003] 1 ILRM 321. 
18
In PB v AB [2012] IEHC 616, for example, the court recognised the semi-inherited nature of the husband’s 
business assets and held that on the basis of previous case law, notably YG v NG [2011] 3 IR 717, it should be 
wary of redistributing them when basic needs are met. For more, see also C v C [2005] IEHC 276; SD v BD 
[2007] IEHC 492. 
19
 Unfortunately, there has been no judgement to date which fully details the appropriate balance to be struck 
where the resources of the parties are insufficient to meet their competing needs.   
20
 [2011] IESC 40 at [22]. However, Buckley ““Proper Provision” and “Property Division”: Partnership in Irish 
Matrimonial Property Law in the wake of T v T” (2004) 3 IJFL 9, at 11 argues:  “[T]here is no meaningful 
practical distinction between “provision” and “division”“. 
21
 [2002] IESC 68, [2003] 1 ILRM 321. 
22
 [2007] IEHC 491. For an in depth analysis of the Supreme Court decision in T v T [2002] IESC 68, [2003] 1 
ILRM 321, see Lucy-Ann Buckley ““Proper Provision” and “Property Division”: Partnership in Irish Matrimonial 
Property Law in the wake of T v T” (2004) 3 IJFL 9. 
23
 GB v AB [2007] IEHC 491. 
24
 The principles underpinning the exercise of the court”s discretion in the reallocation of assets in England and 
Wales as enunciated variously in White v White [2001] 1 AC 596, Miller; McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24, [2006] 1 
FLR 1186 and Charman v Charman (No 4) [2007] EWCA Civ 503, [2007] 1 FLR 1246 are need, compensation and 
sharing.  
25
 C v C [2005] IEHC 276 (emphasis added). For a fuller discussion of the. 
26
 See for example, MD v ND [2011] IESC 18 at [30]. 
27
 Any reform to ameliorate the current difficulties on divorce, could also be modified to facilitate adoption vis-
à-vis ancillary relief provision on judicial separation 
28
 MD v ND [2015] IESC 16 at [4.2] per Clarke and MacMenamin JJ (joint judgment). 
29
 MD v ND [2015] IESC 16 at [1.1] per Clarke and MacMenamin JJ (joint judgment). Here the Supreme Court 
sought to reduce conflict in relation to ancillary relief provision on marital breakdown by devising suggested 
good practice guidelines. They proposed at [4.7] that “in any but the most straightforward of resources cases”, 
the court be presented with “a single and simple schedule … a list of all of the assets which either side 
contends should be taken into account by the court in its overall assessment of proper provision”. They added 
at [4.12], “each party should specify what it says would be proper provision in the light of the overall picture of 
the assets and other resources which emerges from the relevant schedule or schedules”. The best practice set 
out by the SC was considered in the subsequent High Court decision of PD v RD [2015] IEHC 174. Keane J noted 
at [80] that it “reflects an obvious concern for the fair and reasonably expeditious conduct of litigation”. 
